Multi-authority attribute-based encryption scheme from lattices by Zhang, Guoyan et al.
University of Wollongong
Research Online
Faculty of Engineering and Information Sciences -
Papers: Part A Faculty of Engineering and Information Sciences
2015







University of Wollongong, sudq905@uowmail.edu.au
Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information contact the UOW Library:
research-pubs@uow.edu.au
Publication Details
Zhang, G., Qin, J. & Qazi, S. (2015). Multi-authority attribute-based encryption scheme from lattices. Journal of Universal Computer
Science, 21 (3), 483-501.
Multi-authority attribute-based encryption scheme from lattices
Abstract
Access control can selectively restrict access to sensitive information stored by third-party sites on the
Internet. Attribute-based encryption (ABE) schemes can strengthen the effective combination of flexibility
and operability of access control. They allow one sender to encrypt a message for more than one recipient, and
to specify who should be able to decrypt, using attributes alone. Since 2005, many powerful ABE schemes
have been presented, but there are two types of problem that haven't be efficiently resolved so far. On the one
hand, as practical extension of identity-based encryption (IBE) schemes, ABE schemes are also confronted
with key escrow problem. On the other hand, attribute set belonging to one user is usually monitored by
different authorities in this era of collaboration. Multi-authority ABE (MA-ABE) schemes can simultaneously
resolve these problems, but now they have not been thoroughly investigated yet. More precisely, MA-ABE
schemes against quantum attack are the main barrier of the development of ABE schemes in a 'post-quantum'
world. In this paper, we firstly present a MA-ABE scheme from lattices, in which identities of users are
authenticated by a central authority, which improves the efficiency of authentication. Furthermore, different
attribute private keys are still distributed by different authorities, and the central authority cannot obtain any
secret information of other attribute authorities, which resolves key escrow problem to some extent. In
MAABE, attribute private keys belonging to one user are generated by different authorities, and how to ensure
correct decryption is one of the crux of schemes. Our scheme gives a simple solution, and each user's attribute
private keys are combined using sharing of common public information to automatically realize correct
decryption. To our best knowledge, this is the first MA-ABE scheme from lattices, and it is more efficient than
the MA-ABE presented by Melissa Chase. Finally, we present a multi-authority large universe ABE scheme, in
which the sizes of the public key and the ciphertext are only relative to the number of the attribute authorities,
and a user will be able to decrypt a ciphertext if and only if he has at least tK attributes from each authority K.
Keywords
scheme, encryption, attribute, multi, authority, lattices
Publication Details
Zhang, G., Qin, J. & Qazi, S. (2015). Multi-authority attribute-based encryption scheme from lattices. Journal
of Universal Computer Science, 21 (3), 483-501.
This journal article is available at Research Online: http://ro.uow.edu.au/eispapers/3815
Multi-Authority Attribute-Based Encryption Scheme from
Lattices
Guoyan Zhang





(School of Mathematics, Shandong University, Jinan, China
qinjing@sdu.edu.cn)
Shams Qazi
(School of Computer Science and Software Engineering (SCSSE)
University of Wollongong, Wollongong, Australia
shams@uow.edu.au)
Abstract: Access control can selectively restrict access to sensitive information stored
by third-party sites on the Internet. Attribute-based encryption (ABE) schemes can
strengthen the effective combination of flexibility and operability of access control.
They allow one sender to encrypt a message for more than one recipient, and to spec-
ify who should be able to decrypt, using attributes alone. Since 2005, many powerful
ABE schemes have been presented, but there are two types of problem that haven’t
be efficiently resolved so far. On the one hand, as practical extension of identity-based
encryption (IBE) schemes, ABE schemes are also confronted with key escrow problem.
On the other hand, attribute set belonging to one user is usually monitored by different
authorities in this era of collaboration. Multi-authority ABE (MA-ABE) schemes can
simultaneously resolve these problems, but now they have not been thoroughly inves-
tigated yet. More precisely, MA-ABE schemes against quantum attack are the main
barrier of the development of ABE schemes in a ‘post-quantum’ world.
In this paper, we firstly present a MA-ABE scheme from lattices, in which identities
of users are authenticated by a central authority, which improves the efficiency of
authentication. Furthermore, different attribute private keys are still distributed by
different authorities, and the central authority cannot obtain any secret information of
other attribute authorities, which resolves key escrow problem to some extent. In MA-
ABE, attribute private keys belonging to one user are generated by different authorities,
and how to ensure correct decryption is one of the crux of schemes. Our scheme gives
a simple solution, and each user’s attribute private keys are combined using sharing
of common public information to automatically realize correct decryption. To our best
knowledge, this is the first MA-ABE scheme from lattices, and it is more efficient than
the MA-ABE presented by Melissa Chase. Finally, we present a multi-authority large
universe ABE scheme, in which the sizes of the public key and the ciphertext are only
relative to the number of the attribute authorities, and a user will be able to decrypt
a ciphertext if and only if he has at least tK attributes from each authority K.
Key Words: LWE, MA-ABE, Lattices, Preimage Sampling Functions.
Category: E.3
Journal of Universal Computer Science, vol. 21, no. 3 (2015), 483-501
submitted: 30/6/14, accepted: 28/2/15, appeared: 1/3/15 © J.UCS
1 Introduction
Cloud computing paradigm is viewed as a big step to make computation as a
public utility, which provides an opportunity for users, companies, and public
organizations to reduce costs and increase efficiencies. Information in local com-
puters is now transferred to cloud platforms, then confidentiality and integrity of
information are becoming more and more important in cloud computing. Access
control is one of the key technologies used for security enforcement of informa-
tion. An access control model formally specifies how to decide whether an access
request should be allowed or repudiated. There were many schemes to consider
information security in cloud computing [Vleju, M. 14, Rastogi and Solms 12],
but they couldn’t enable efficient one-to-many broadcast encryption and fine-
grained access control. In order to make access control more flexible, Sahai, A.
and Waters, B. introduced the concept of attribute-based encryption (ABE)
schemes in 2005 [Sahai and Waters 05], in which a user’s keys and ciphertexts
were labeled with sets of descriptive attributes and a particular key set can de-
crypt a particular ciphertext only if there is a match between the attributes of
the ciphertext and the user’s keys. After that, ABE attracted much attention as
a relatively new encryption technology.
There were two variants of ABE schemes proposed: key-policy vari-
ant (KP-ABE) [Goyal et al. 06] and ciphertext-policy variant (CP-ABE)
[Bethencourt et al. 07]. In the KP-ABE, every ciphertext is associated with a
set of attributes, and each user’s secret keys are associated with a threshold
access structure on attributes. Reversely, in the CP-ABE, attributes are as-
sociated with user private keys and access structures with ciphertexts. Many
schemes have been presented: Schemes [Goyal et al. 06, Bethencourt et al. 07,
Ostrovsky et al. 07, Lewko et al. 10, Goyal et al. 08, Attrapadung et al. 11,
Cheung and Newport 07] contributed to make the access structure more expres-
sive. Schemes [Daza et al. 10, Emura et al. 09, Herranz et al. 10] were devoted
to get constant-size ciphertexts. Scheme [Xie et al. 13] proposed construction
with efficient attribute and user revocation.
Similar to identity-based encryption schemes, the attribute authority is able
to compute private key corresponding to any attribute of any user such that he
is free to engage in malicious activities without any risk of being confronted in a
court of law, which is called key escrow problem. There were many cryptosystems
to resolve this problem such as certificateless cryptosystem, certificate-based
cryptosystem and multi-authority cryptosystem. Multi-authority cryptosystem
has more extensive application, because the cooperation of different departments
often makes it possible for multi-authority to authenticate one common user.
MA-ABE schemes allow the sender to specify for each authority K a set of
attributes monitored by that authority and a number tK so that the message
can be decrypted only by a user who has at least tK of the given attributes
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from each authority K. MA-ABE schemes also allow any number of attribute
authorities to be corrupted, and guarantee the security of encryption as long
as the required attributes cannot be obtained exclusively from those authorities
and the trusted authority remains honest. This is an attractive solution and also
successfully avoids placing trust in a single entity by making the system operate
in a distributed way.
1.1 Related Works
Chase proposed the first MA-ABE scheme with a global identifier which com-
bined users’ private keys together to ensure correct decryption [Chase 07], but
the scheme relied on a central authority who knew all the secret keys of any
attribute authority in order to combine all the attribute private keys belong-
ing to the same user. Compared with the scheme [Chase 07], Muller, S. et
al. gave a scheme with a centralized authority that realized any LSSS access
structure [Muller et al. 08], but their proof was limited to non-adaptive queries
only. The scheme achieved roughly the same functionality as the engineering
approach above, except one could still acquire attributes from additional au-
thorities without revisiting the central authority. Chase, M. and Chow, S. gave
a scheme without central authority using a distributed pseudo random function
[Chase and Chow 09]. However, it only supported an AND policy. Lin, H. et al.
[Lin et al. 08] gave a threshold-based scheme that was also somewhat decentral-
ized, in which they must interact during the system setup. Furthermore, the
scheme was only secure up to collusion of m users, where m was a system pa-
rameter chosen at setup. Lewko, A. and Waters, B. proposed a new MA-ABE
scheme [Lewko and Waters 11]. In their scheme, any party could simply act as
an authority by creating a public key and issuing private keys to different users,
and different authorities needed not even be aware of each other.
All the above schemes were based on traditional number theory hard
problems which were proved to have polynomial-time solutions in the envi-
ronment of quantum computers. In contrast, lattice hardness problems can
resist quantum cryptanalysis and have strong worst-case/average-case secu-
rity guarantees. Furthermore, the mathematical properties of lattices make
them both relatively efficient and flexible to enable the construction of pow-
erful cryptosystems. So lattices have recently emerged as a powerful math-
ematical platform on which to build a rich variety of cryptographic primi-
tives. Since the work [Ajtai and Dwork 97], there were many schemes proposed:
one-way functions and collision-resistant hash functions [Ajtai and Dwork 97,
Micciancio 02], public-key encryption schemes [Ajtai and Dwork 97, Regev 05,
Sahai and Waters 05], identity-based encryption schemes [Gentry et al. 08,
Cash et al. 10, Agrawal et al. 10], trapdoor functions [Gentry et al. 08], fully
homomorphic encryption schemes [Gentry 10] and attribute-based encryption
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schemes [Boyen 13, Agrawal et al. 12], but there were no MA-ABE schemes from
lattices yet.
1.2 Our Contributions
In this paper, we firstly adopt the method in [Chase 07] to give the first MA-
ABE scheme from lattices, and also introduce a multi-authority large universe
ABE scheme whose public key and the ciphertext are independently with the
size of attribute universe.
– Our first MA-ABE scheme from lattices has many excellent characteristics:
• Our scheme can resolve key escrow problem: It has also a central au-
thority, but the central authority doesn’t know any authorities’ secret
keys different with scheme [Chase 07], and he cannot be free to engage
in malicious activities. He can only authenticate identities of users and
combine attributes with users to tie users’ private keys together.
• Setup phase has no private interactivity among attribute authorities:
Attribute authorities generate their master public key and secret key
pairs respectively, and they also independently present attribute private
keys to users without any interactivity. Sharing of public information
combines all the attribute private keys of a user to ensure correct de-
cryption.
• Our scheme keeps the characteristic of ABE: During encryption, the
global identifier of user is not be used such that decryptors can correctly
recover plaintext only using attributes alone.
• Our scheme can resist collusion attack of users: By using of preimage
sampling functions, the images of different users’ attribute private keys
cannot be recovered into useful information, and CA combines the at-
tribute sets with the identities of users by using sharing of public infor-
mation.
• Our scheme ensures backward security and forward security: When at-
tributes or attribute authorities need to be updated, attribute authorities
can reshare the public information to generate and distribute attribute
private keys of users again.
– We also give a MA-IBE scheme with large attribute universe, in which our
generation of attribute private keys is a bit different from the above scheme.
Each attribute authority can only have one pair of master public key and
master secret key, but it can generate different private keys according to
different attributes such that the sizes of public key and the ciphertext are
proportional to the total number of attribute authorities.
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2 Preliminaries and Definitions
2.1 Notation
In the following, we assume that the attribute universe U can be partitioned
into d disjoint sets U1, U2, . . . , Ud, where d is the number of authorities. Each
set will be monitored by a different authority. There is also one trusted central
authority CA. We let UGID denote the attribute set of user with global identifier
GID and let UC denote the attribute set combined with a ciphertext. UKGID and
UKC are the attribute sets handled by authority K in the attribute sets of the
user GID and the ciphertext C respectively. UCGID is the intersection of user’s
attribute set and ciphertext attribute set.
2.2 MA-ABE Scheme
Our definition and security model of MA-ABE schemes are similar to those in
[Chase 07], but with significant differences from [Chase 07] that we believe more
reasonable. Each attribute authority K is also assigned a tuple (tK , dK). A
MA-ABE scheme is composed of four algorithms as follows:
Setup. A randomized algorithm run by both central authority CA and at-
tribute authorities. Taking as input security parameters, it outputs system public
key and each attribute authority’s master public key and secret key.
Attribute Private Key Generation. A randomized algorithm run by a
central authority CA and attribute authority K, taking as input the attribute
authority’s secret key, the attribute authority’s tuple (tK , dK), a user’s global
identifier GID, and a set of attributes in the authority’s domain UKGID. CA
combines GID with the attribute set, and gives the result to attribute authority
K (We will assume that the user’s claim of these attributes has been verified
by CA before this algorithm is run). Attribute authority K outputs attribute
private keys for the user.
Encryption. A randomized algorithm run by a sender. Taking as input a set
of attributes for each authority, a message, and the system public key, it outputs
the ciphertext.
Decryption. A deterministic algorithm run by a user with global identi-
fier GID. Taking as input a ciphertext, which was encrypted under attribute
set UC and decryption keys for an attribute set UK . Output a message m, if
|UKGID
⋂
UCGID| ≥ tK satisfies for K = 1, 2, . . . , d.
2.3 Security Model of Multi-Authority ABE System
Let λ be the security parameter. Consider the following game:
Setup
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– The adversary sends a list of attribute sets UC = U1C , . . . , U
d
C , one for each
authority. He must also provide a list of corrupted authorities which cannot
include the central authority.
– The challenger generates parameters for the system and sends them to the
adversary. These mean the system public key, master public keys for all
honest authorities, and secret keys for all corrupt authorities.
Secret Key Queries
The adversary can make as many secret key queries as he wants to attribute
authorities. The only requirement is that for each GID, there must be at least
one honest authority from which the adversary requests fewer than tK of the
attributes given in UKC , i.e. the adversary never requests enough attributes to
decrypt the challenge ciphertext.
Challenge
The challenger chooses a message b ∈ {0, 1}, computes the ciphertext of b
for attribute set UC , and sends this ciphertext to the adversary.
More Secret Key Queries
The adversary may make more secret key queries subject to the requirements
described above.
Guess
The adversary outputs a guess b′. If b = b′, the adversary is said to succeed.
A MA-ABE scheme is selective attributes secure if there is a negligible func-
tion ε such that, in the above game, any PPT adversary will succeed with prob-
ability at most 1/2 + ε(λ).
2.4 Concrete Trapdoor Functions with Preimage Sampling
[Gentry et al. 08]
Let q = poly(n), m ≥ 5n lg q and L = m1+ε for any ε > 0. The col-
lection is parameterized by some Gaussian parameter s ≥ L.ω(√log m),
and trapdoor functions with preimage sampling are described as (Trap-
Gen, SampleDom, SamplePre).
– TrapGen. The function generator uses the algorithm from Ajt99 algorithm
to choose (A, T ), where A ∈ Zn×mq is statistically close to uniform and
T ⊂ Λ⊥(A) is a good basis with ‖T ‖ ≤ L. The matrix A (and q) defines the
function fA(.), and the good basis T is its trapdoor.
– SampleDom. The function fA(.) is defined as fA(e) = Ae mod q, with do-
main Dn = {e ∈ Zm : ‖e‖ ≤ s√m} and range Rn = Znq . The input distri-
bution is DZm, s, which can be sampled using discrete Gaussian probability
distribution scheme with the standard basis for Zm.
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– SamplePre. The trapdoor inversion algorithm SampleISIS(A, T, s, u) sam-
ples from f−1A (u) as follows: first, choose via linear algebra an arbitrary
t ∈ Zm such that At = u mod q(such a t exists for all but an at most q−n
fraction of A). Then sample v using SampleD(T, s, −t), and output e = t+v.
2.5 Simple and Efficient “Hash-and-Sign” Digital Signature
Schemes [Gentry et al. 08]
The scheme is built upon a collection of trapdoor functions with Preimage Sam-
pling given by (TrapGen, SampleDom,SamplePre), and operates relative
to a function H = {Hn : {0, 1} → Rn} that is modeled as a random oracle
(recall that Dn and Rn are the domain and range, respectively, of the collection
for security parameter n).
SigKeyGen (1n). Let (a, t)← TrapGen(1n), where a describes a function
fa and t is its trapdoor. The verification key is a and the signing key is t.
Sign (t, m). If (m, σm) is in local storage, output σm. Else, let σm ←
SamplePre(t, H(m)), store (m, σm), and output σm.
Verify (a, m, σ). If σ ∈ Dn and fa(σ) = H(m), accept. Else, reject.
Proposition. The scheme described above is SUF-CMA-secure in the ran-
dom oracle model.
2.6 Learning With Errors
The LWE (learning with errors) problem was first defined by Regev, O.
[Regev 05], and has been extensively studied and used. We use the decisional
version of the LWE problem.
Definition 2.1. A prime q, a positive integer n, and a distribution χ over Zq
are all public. A (Zq, n, χ)-problem instance consists of access to an unspecified
challenge oracle O, being either a noisy pseudo-random sampler Os carrying some
constant random secret key s or a truly random sampler O′s, whose behaviors
are respectively as follows:
Os: outputs noisy pseudo-random samples of the form (ωi, υi) = (ωi, ωTi s +
xi) ∈ Znq × Zq, where s ∈ Znq , is a uniformly distributed persistent secret key
that is invariant across invocations, xi ∈ Znq is a freshly generated ephemeral
additive noise component with distribution χ and ωi ∈ Znq is a fresh uniformly
distributed vector revealed as part of the output.
O′s: outputs truly random samples (ωi, υi) ∈ Znq × Zq, drawn independently
uniformly at random in the entire domain Znq × Zq.
The (Zq, n, χ)-problem statement allows an unspecified number of queries
to be made to the challenge oracle O, with no stated prior bound. An algorithm
A decides the (Zq, n, χ)-LWE problem, if |Pr[AOs = 1]− Pr[AO′s = 1]| is non-
negligible for a random s ∈ Znq .
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Definition 2.2. The interactive LWEq problem is described as follows
[Gentry et al. 08]: On input a matrix A ∈ Zn×mq , a vector p ∈ Zmq , a hash
function H : (0, 1)∗ → Znq , a value z, and access to an oracle, returning a sam-
ple from f−1A (H(z)) (the same value is returned for repeated queries on the same
z). The goal is to distinguish whether p is either a LWE instance or uniform,
i.e., between the case that p = AT s + x for some s← Znq , x← χm, and the case
that p← Zmq is uniform. When H is modeled as a random oracle, the interactive
LWE problem is hard as long as the standard LWE problem is hard.
3 MA-ABE Scheme from Lattices
In the previous MA-IBE schemes, each authority must authenticate identities of
users which greatly reduces the efficiency. In our scheme, there is a central au-
thority CA which is responsible to authenticate users’ identities and to combine
attribute sets with identities of users, which efficiently prevents the collusion
of different users. The central authority CA must always honestly combine at-
tribute sets with identities of users. Because central authority CA does not know
all secret keys of other authorities, he cannot generate all attribute private keys
on behalf of other attribute authorities. Simultaneously, we adopt the strategy
in [Chase 07] to require that each user has a unique global identifier (GID),
and a user must present his GID to central authority CA in order to receive a
coherent set of keys. However, encryption need not the unique global identifier,
and the ability to decrypt is the same with traditional ABE scheme independent
of the GID.
3.1 Concrete Protocol
Assuming there are d attribute authorities, and each authority K can authenti-
cate dK attributes. CA is a central authority that any authority could be. Let λ
be a security parameter, q = q(λ), p = p(λ) be two primes, n = n(λ), m = m(λ)
be two positive integers, σ = σ(λ), α = α(λ) be two positive Gaussian parame-
ters. tK is the number that a user can only decrypt if he has at least tK of the
given attributes from each authority K. H : (0, 1)∗ → Zq is a hash function.
Let [dK ] ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , dK} denote users’ attribute set that authority K moni-
tors, and |[dK ]| ≥ tK . U denotes attribute universe. For simplicity, we can take
the first |U | elements of Zp to be the universe. Namely, integers 1, 2, . . . , |U |.
SetUp. Given a security parameter λ and n, m, σ, α, q as inputs, each au-
thority K runs Ajt99’s lattice trapdoor generation algorithm dK times to get
mpkiK = A
i
K ∈ Zn×mq , mskiK = T iK ∈ Λ⊥q , (i = 1, 2, . . . , dK), as master pub-
lic key and master secret key of authority K. Each authority randomly chooses
a vector uK ∈ Znq , and CA computes random vector u ∈ Znq = u1 + u2 +
. . . + uK(mod q) = (u1, u2, . . . , un). CA chooses a family of (d − 1)-degree
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polynomial sets F = {fi = (f1i , f2i , . . . , fni ) : {0, 1}l → Znq } such that for
i = 1, 2, . . . , d, f1i (0) = u1, f
2
i (0) = u2, . . . , f
n
i (0) = un. Define system public
key as MPK = mpk11 , mpk
2
1 , . . . , mpk
d1




d, . . . , mpk
dd
d , u, F .
Attribute Private Key Generation. Given user’s identity GID, the cen-
tral authority CA computes j = H(GID) and uses it as index to choose (d− 1)-
degree polynomial set fj = (f1j , f
2
j , . . . , f
n
j ) from the family of (d − 1)-degree
polynomial set F . CA computers d sharing of u to d authorities. More precisely,
he sets (ur, 1, ur, 2, . . . , ur, d) = (f rj (1), f
r
j (2), . . . , f
r
j (d)) as sharing of ur for
r = 1, 2, . . . , n. Each authority K gets his share u′K = (u1, K , u2, K , . . . , un, K )
and divides it into dK sharing uK1 , uK2 , . . . , uKdK by using (tK , dK) Shamir
secret sharing scheme on every coordinate of u′K , K = 1, . . . , d, and he runs
the algorithm SamplePre to find eKi such that AiKeKi = uKi , i ∈ [dK ] and
sends eKi , i ∈ [dK ] to user with identity GID. The user’s private key is
SKGID = (eKi)i∈[dK ], K = 1, . . . , d.
Encrypt. Given system public key MPK, the attribute set U1C , . . . , U
d
C and
a message b ∈ {0, 1}:




dK , choose a uniformly random s ← Znq , a
noise term x← χα, q and xK, j ← χmα, q, j ∈ UKC , K = 1, 2, . . . , d.
– Compute
c← uT s + Dx + bq/2 ∈ Zq,
cK, j ← (AjK)T s + DxK, j ∈ Zmq , j ∈ UKC , K = 1, 2, . . . , d.
– Output ciphertext CT = (c, {cK, j}, j ∈ UKC , K = 1, 2, . . . , d).
Decrypt. Given system public key MPK, the user’s private key SKGID,
and a ciphertext CT . If ∀K, |UKGID
⋂
UCGID| ≥ tK , then the entity does:






















KjcK, j (mod q).
– Outputs 0 if b′ is closer to 0 than to q/2mod q, otherwise outputs 1.
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3.2 Correctness and Parameter Declaration
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T DxK, j | ≤ q/4.
3.3 System Update
Here, we discuss system update caused by the update of attributes and attribute
authorities. In our scheme, each authority needn’t to regenerate his master pub-
lic key and secret key during system update, and they only distribute part of
attribute private keys again.
– If there is an attribute withdrawn from attribute universe U , and we assume
that attribute authority κ who monitors this attribute. Authority κ needn’t
to reset his setup phase, and he can delete the public key corresponding
to this attribute and share his u′κ to (uκ, 1, uκ, 2, . . . , uκ, dκ−1) again. Then
he generates the other attribute private keys according to the new sharing
and distributes them. If there are many attributes withdrawn from attribute
universe, the similar proceeding can also do. When there are new attributes
added to attribute universe U , attribute authorities who monitor these at-
tributes also need to renew their sharing and to distribute the attribute
private keys as the above step after CA verifies the validation of these at-
tributes. Renewing the sharing makes the scheme ensure both backward
security and forward security.
– The number of authorities in the system can be changed because of the
joining or withdrawing of authorities: it is possible to allow the central au-
thority to add additional attribute authorities to the system at any point
or to cancel the right of attribute authorities. CA can run system update
only by computing new sharing of u, and the rest of attribute authorities
also needn’t renew their public keys and private keys. They only renew the
sharing and generate new attribute private keys to realize update.
3.4 Security Analysis
In our system, each authority chooses his own public key and secret key pairs
respectively, so even if the adversary corrupts almost all of the authorities, he
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cannot obtain any information about other authorities without being corrupted.
In the following security analysis, we adopt a weaker model in which the adver-
sary can get any attribute private keys, even if the challenge attributes, but we
don’t present him the master secret keys of the corrupted authorities. We prove
its security under an “interactive” version of the of LWE hardness assumption
in the presence of a signing oracle for the (stateful) “Hash-and-Sign” Digital
Signature Schemes in random oracle model. A similar “interactive” assumption
about the hardness of “interactive quadratic residuosity assumption” was used
for the IBE [Gentry et al. 08, Boneh et al. 07].
Theorem 1. Let A be a PPT adversary with advantage ε > 0 against the
following selective attributes secure game for the MA-ABE scheme. If A can
query any polynomial signature oracles, assuming that si, (i = 1, 2, . . . , d) is
the size of the challenge attribute set to the ith authority, then there is a PPT




Proof. Suppose A is a polynomial-time adversary, and he can succeed against
the proposed scheme in the following selective attributes secure game with ad-
vantage ε, then we can construct an algorithm B to resolve the decisional version
of LWE problem with advantage ε/(
d∑
i=1
si + 1) by using A as a sub-routine al-
gorithm.
Setup
– The adversary A sends a list of challenge attribute sets UC = U1C , . . . , U
d
C ,
one for each authority, assuming |U iC | = si. Without loss of generality, we
assume that the attributes in U iC , (i = 1, . . . , d) are the first si attributes
monitored by authority i.




si + 1 LWE samples that we denote as
{(W1, V1)}, {(W 11 , V 11 ), (W 21 , V 21 ), . . . , (Wm1 , V m1 )}, {(W 12 , V 12 ), (W 22 , V 22 ),
. . . , (Wm2 , V
m




















B chooses hash function H1 : (0, 1)∗ → Zq and H2 : (0, 1)∗ → Znq , and he
constructs system public key PP as follows:



































– The other matrices Aij , j = si + 1, . . . , di are chosen using Ajt99’s lattice
trapdoor generation scheme with a trapdoor T ij .
– The vector u is constructed from the LWE challenge, u = W1. The system
public key is returned to the adversary A.
Secret Key Queries
B answers each secret key query for attribute set Uq = U1q , . . . , U
d
q and global
identifier GID as follows:
For GID, B computes index l = H1(GID) to choose (d− 1)-degree polyno-
mial fl = (fl, 1, fl, 2, . . . , fl, n) such that fl(0) = (fl, 1(0), fl, 2(0), . . . , fl, n(0)) =
u = (u1, u2, . . . , ud), and obtains the d sharing u′1, u′2, . . . , u′d of u, and
u′i = (fl, 1(i), fl, 2(i), . . . , fl, n(i)). There are two cases about secret key queries:
Case 1. Set [d] denotes the set of attribute authorities whose attributes
satisfy |U iq
⋂
U iC | = |Ii| ≥ ti
– Let U iq
⋂
U iC = Ii, |Ii| ≥ ti. Then, note that B has trapdoors for the matrices
corresponding to the set U iq − Ii.
– Choose {Ui, j , j = 1, 2, . . . , ti−1} ⊂ Ii. Pick ei, j randomly using algorithm
SampleGaussian. Set
Aijei, j = ui, j , j = 1, 2, . . . , ti − 1, i ∈ [d] ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , d}.
– Represent the sharing of u′i symbolically as ui, j = u
′
i + ai, 1j + ai, 2j
2 +
ai, ti−1jti−1, i = 1, . . . , d. Where, ai, 1, ai, 2, . . . , ai, ti−1, i = 1, . . . , d are
vector variables (each is of length n). ui, 1, ui, 2, . . . , ui, ti−1, u′i commonly
determine the values for ai, 1, ai, 2, . . . , ai, ti−1, i ∈ [d], which determine all
sharing ui, 1, ui, 2, . . . , ui, |Uiq|, i = 1, . . . , d.
– For j = ti, ti + 1, . . . , |Ii|, the trapdoors cannot be known. B defines
H2(gi, j) = ui, j , i ∈ [d]. Query the signature oracle for gi, j (i ∈ [d]) ac-
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– For j = |Ii|+ 1, |Ii|+ 2, . . . , |U iq|, B can invoke SamplePre(Aij, T ij , ui, j , i ∈
[d]) to get ei, j satisfying Aijei, j = ui, j , i ∈ [d].
– Return ei, j , j = 1, 2, . . . , |U iq|, i ∈ [d].
Case 2. Let [d] denote the set of attribute authorities whose attributes satisfy
|U iq
⋂
U iC | = |Ii| < ti.
– Let U iq
⋂
U iC = Ii, |Ii| < ti. Then, note that B has trapdoors for the matrices
corresponding to the set U iq − Ii.
– For Ui, j ∈ Ii, pick ei, j randomly using algorithm SampleGaussian. Set
Aijei, j = ui, j , j = 1, . . . , |Ii|, i ∈ [d].
– Represent the sharing of u′i symbolically as ui, j = u
′
i + ai, 1j + ai, 2j
2 +
ai, ti−1j
ti−1, i ∈ [d]. Where, ai, 1, ai, 2, . . . , ai, ti−1, i ∈ [d] are vector vari-
ables and each is of length n.
– Since |Ii| < ti, and there are ti − 1 variables ai, 1, ai, 2, . . . , ai, ti−1, i ∈ [d]
by choosing ti − 1 − |Ii| sharing ui, si+2, ui, si+3, . . . , ui, ti randomly, the
values for ai, 1, ai, 2, . . . , ai, ti−1, i ∈ [d] are determined. This determines all
sharing ui, 1, ui, 2, . . . , ui, |Uqi |, i ∈ [d]. For j = |Ii|+1, |Ii|+2, . . . , |U
q
i |, and
B can invoke SamplePre(Aij , T
i
j , ui, j , i ∈ [d]) to get ei, j satisfying Aijei, j =
ui, j , i ∈ [d].
– Return ei, j , j = 1, 2, . . . , |U qi |, i ∈ [d].
Remark. The adversary can make as many secret key queries as he wants to
the honest attribute authorities. The only requirements are that for each GID,
there must be at least one honest authority K from which the adversary requests
fewer than tK of the attributes given in UKC , i.e. the adversary never requests
enough attributes to decrypt the challenge ciphertext.
Challenge
B chooses a bit b, computes the encryption of b for attribute set UC as follows:






c0 ← DV1 + bq/2
and
ci = (DV 1i , DV
2
i , . . . . DV
m
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– Outputs ciphertext CT = (c0, {ci}, i = 1, 2, . . . ,
d∑
i=1
si), and sends this ci-
phertext to the adversary.
More Secret Key Queries
The adversary may make more secret key queries subjecting to the require-
ments described above.
Guess
When the adversary A outputs a guess b∗, the simulator B uses that guess
to determine an answer on the LWE oracle: Output “genuine”, if b = b∗, else
output “random”.
4 MA-ABE Scheme from Lattices with Constant Size
In the above scheme, the size of system public keys is proportional to the total
number of attributes in the system, and the size of the ciphertext is proportional
to the total number of attributes in the ciphertext. All these cause low efficiency
when there is a large attribute universe. In this section, we give a multi-authority
large universe ABE scheme. In the following scheme, the sizes of the public key
and the ciphertext are only relative to the number of the attribute authorities.
A user will be able to decrypt a ciphertext if and only if he has at least tK of
the attributes from each authority K.
4.1 Concrete Protocol
Assuming there are d authorities, and each authority K can authenticate dK
attributes. There is a central authority CA that any authority can act as. Let λ be
a security parameter. Let q = q(λ), p = p(λ) be two primes, n = n(λ), m = m(λ)
be two positive integers, and σ = σ(λ), α = α(λ) be two positive Gaussian
parameters. tK is the number that a user can only decrypt if he has at least tK
of the given attributes from each authority K. Let [dK ] ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , dK}, and
|[dK ]| ≥ tK . Define the universe U of attributes. For simplicity, we can take the
first |U | elements of Zp, to be the universe. Namely, the integers 1, 2, . . . , |U |.
SetUp. Given a security parameter λ and n, m, σ, α, q as input, each au-
thority K runs Ajt99’s lattice trapdoor generation algorithm to get mpkK =
AK ∈ Zn×mq , mskK = TK ∈ Λ⊥q (AK) as master public key and mas-
ter secret key of authority K. Each authority randomly chooses a vector
uK ∈ Znq , and CA computes random vector u ∈ Znq = u1 + u2 + . . . +
uK(mod q) = (u1, u2, . . . , un). CA chooses a family of (d − 1)-degree polyno-
mial sets F = {fi = (f1i , f2i , . . . , fni ) : {0, 1}l → Znq } such that ∀i, f1i (0) =
u1, f
2
i (0) = u2, . . . , f
n
i (0) = un. Define the system master public key as
MPK = mpk1, mpk2, . . . , mpkd, u, F .
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Attribute Key Generation. Given a global identifier GID and attribute
set UGID = U1GID, U
2
GID . . . U
d
GID, the central authority CA computes j =
H(GID) and uses it as index to choose (d − 1)-degree polynomial fj from the
family of (d − 1)-degree polynomials F = {fn : {0, 1}l → Znq }. CA comput-
ers d sharing of u to d authorities. Namely, he sets (ur, 1, ur, 2, . . . , ur, d) =
(f rj (1), f
r
j (2), . . . , f
r
j (d)) as sharing of ur for r = 1, 2, . . . , n. Each authority
K gets his sharing u′K = (u1, K , u2, K , . . . , un, K ) and divides it into dK shar-
ing (uK1 , uK2 , . . . , uKdK ) by using (tK , dK) Shamir secret sharing scheme on
every coordinate of u′K , K = 1, . . . , d. Each authority K runs the algorithm
SamplePre, and finds eKi such that AKeKi = uKi , i ∈ UKGID, ∀K, and sends
eKi , i ∈ UKGID, K = 1, . . . , d, to user with global identifier GID. The private
key is SKID = (eKi)i∈UKGID , K = 1, . . . , d.
Encrypt. Given system public key MPK and a message b ∈ {0, 1}:




dK , choose a uniformly random s ← Znq , a
noise term x← χα, q and xi ← χmα, q, i = 1, . . . , d.
– Compute
c0 ← uT s + Dx + bq/2 ∈ Zq, ci ← ATi s + Dxi ∈ Zmq (mod q), i = 1, . . . , d.
– Output ciphertext CT = (c0, {ci}, i = 1, . . . , d).
Decrypt. Given system public key MPK, the private key SKGID, and a
ciphertext CT . If |UKGID| ≥ tK , ∀K, then the entity does:
– Computes Lagrangian coefficients Li, j , Li so that
∑
j∈[dK ]







i = u (mod q).
– Computes








ij ci (mod q).
– Outputs 0 if b′ is closer to 0 than to q/2 (mod q), otherwise outputs 1.
4.2 Security Analysis
Theorem 2. Assuming A is a PPT adversary with non-negligible advantage
ε > 0 that succeeds against the large universe MA-ABE scheme in the following
selective attributes secure game. If A can query any polynomial signature oracles,
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assuming that si, (i = 1, 2, . . . , d) is the size of the challenge attribute set to
the ith authority, then there exists a PPT algorithm B that decides the LWE




Proof. It is similar to the proof of scheme in Section 3, and thus we omit it
here.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we present the first MA-ABE scheme from lattices. Similar to
Chase’s scheme, there is a central authority in our scheme, but the central au-
thority in our scheme cannot generate any attribute private key, which really
avoids the key escrow problem without adding any burden. Furthermore, differ-
ent users’ attribute private keys cannot be combined to give correct decryption,
which avoids the collusion threat of different users. Finally, we give a MA-ABE
scheme under large universe of attributes, in which the sizes of the public key
and the ciphertext are only relative to the number of the attribute authorities.
MA-ABE schemes from lattices without central authority are more difficult to
design, and this is our future work direction.
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